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RELIGIOUS REASONS IN PUBLIC: LET A
THOUSAND FLOWERS BLOOM, BUT BE
PREPARED TO PRUNE
CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE*

In a recent speech, Senator Barack Obama claimed that
democracy requires political actors to "translate their concerns
into universal, rather than religion-specific, values.", If I
understand him correctly, we need to translate from the religious
to the universal because, "in a pluralistic democracy .... [p]olitics
depends on our ability to persuade each other of common aims
based on a common reality."2 And we cannot do that if we "simply
point to the teachings of [our] church or evoke God's will." 3 So it
is the requirement of persuasion amongst a pluralistic population
that requires us to advert to the universal.
I believe this argument is fallacious. In order to explain why,
it will be helpful to reflect, if only briefly, on the kind of political
reality that elicits such claims. More particularly, I will reflect
on the sliver of political reality described by Allen Hertzke in his
excellent book, "Freeing God's Children: The Unlikely Alliance
4
for Global Human Rights."
FREEING GOD'S CHILDREN

Hertzke begins by reminding us that, in the past century, the
demographic center of Christianity has shifted decisively to the
"global south," so that the 'average' Christian is a poor,
vulnerable, "female of color." 5 Because the United States is, as a
*

United States Naval Academy

1 Senator Barack Obama, 'Call to Renewal' Keynote Address, (June 28, 2006),
http://obama.senate.gov/speech/ 060628-call-torenewal/.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 (Rowman & Littlefield 2004).
5 Id. at 17, 21.
An unheralded demographic revolution, which accelerated in the last half of the twentieth
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demographic matter, an overwhelmingly Christian country,
because many Christians in the United States have robust social
networks with their co-religionists around the world, and because
their co-religionists are often both poor and persecuted, there is a
large, wealthy and motivated body of religious citizens that can
be tapped to use American power to further the well-being of the
most vulnerable human beings on the planet. Not only can they
be tapped, they have been. If Hertzke is correct, various
churches, televangelists and denominational bodies were crucial
constituents of a broad and diverse coalition that has had
significant success in enacting legislation that exposes and
prevents egregious violations of human rights around the world.
For example, intensive lobbying by Michael Horowitz and Nina
Shea, aided by a groundswell of popular support, 6 goaded
Congress into passing the 1998 International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), despite powerful opposition from some in the State
Department, certain business interests, and a few human rights
organizations. Among other things, the IRFA set up various
mechanisms designed to expose the execution of converts, the
jailing of clergy, and the torture of heretics by secular regimes
like North Korea and China, as well as by religious regimes like
Sudan and Iran.
As Hertzke tells the story, passage of the IRFA galvanized
support for other morally important measures: the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 which, among other things,
sanctions countries that systematically neglect to criminalize and
punish those who sell women and young children into sexual
century, has produced a tectonic shift of the Christian population toward the 'global
south.' A function of both lapsing faith in the West and dramatic indigenous growth
elsewhere, this shift has momentous implications for both U.S. domestic politics and
international relations. Consider the trends. In 1900, 80 percent of the world's Christian
population resided in Europe and North America. By 2000, that figure was down to a
rapidly declining 40 percent, leaving a rising 50 percent of the world's Christians living in
Latin America, Africa and Asia. The most dramatic demographic transformation is
occurring in Africa. While Christianity comprised less than 10 percent of the continent's
population in 1900, it is now nearly half, with over a majority in sub-Saharan Africa
professing Christianity.
Id. at 17; see generally PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF GLOBAL

CHRISTIANITY (Oxford University Press 2002).
6 ALLEN HERTZKE, FREEING GOD'S CHILDREN: AN UNLIKELY ALLIANCE 195 (Rowman

& Littlefield 2004). Support included adroit use of scarce resources, for example,
information packets on religious persecution the Southern Baptist Convention sent to its
40,000 member congregations, and radio spots by James Dobson and Charles Colson that
reached millions. Id.
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servitude, 7 and the Sudan Peace Act of 2002, which demanded
that the "world's most violent abuser of the right to freedom of
religion and belief' terminate a policy of "forced Islamicization"
that sparked a two-decade long civil war and cost the lives of 2
million black Africans. 8 If Hertzke is correct, the Sudan Peace
Act was a crucial precursor to "a historic 2004 peace treaty
ending civil war between the Khartoum regime and southern
rebel groups." 9
Hertzke's piece is a rather hopeful narrative in a political story
that is all too often both farce and tragedy. He describes a
willingness to compromise, cooperate, and acquiesce, exhibited by
the occasional alliance of religious and secular combatants, often
portrayed as mortal enemies, destined to drag us back to the bad
old days of religious warfare and sectarian strife. To take only
one of many revealing vignettes, Hertzke tells us that in the final
push to pass the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, "members of
Congress received a letter from Gloria Steinem and other
feminist leaders at the very moment they were being lobbied by
such figures as Charles Colson of Prison Fellowship [Ministries],
Richard Land of the SBC,... and John Busby of the Salvation
Army."1 As one participant recounted, "A conference was held in
the Senate caucus room in which 'Bill Bennett got up and gave a
speech and then after that we read Gloria's statement.'. .The
gist of the conference was [that] 'Bill Bennett and Gloria Steinem
and Chuck Colson ...all are saying the same thing."'z Despite
determined opposition from select human rights groups and
business interests, Congress passed the legislation. Shortly
thereafter, witnesses at a celebration in a Capitol Hill Room
could overhear Paul Wellstone declare Sam Brownback "a joy to
work with," and Barbara Mikulski greet her "fellow
abolitionists," to include evangelical activist Gary Haugen, who
took the opportunity to inform his audience that "the lowest
circle of Hell is not hot enough" for those who traffic people into
2
sex slavery.'
7 Id. at 316.

8 Id. at 239.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 330.
11 Id (quoting Laura Lederer interview, March 2001).
12 Id.
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"UNIVERSAL VALUES" IN POLITICAL ARGUMENT

Hertzke's story seems to belie Senator Obama's understanding
of the requirements of political persuasion. So far as I can tell,
Hertzke's primary protagonists were able to garner support from
a dizzying array of diversely committed groups, not by appeal to
'universal values,' but by showing how the particularities of
distinct and contending worldviews provided their adherents
with reason that should persuade them to support the IRFA,
Trafficking Victim's Protection Act, and the Sudan Peace Act.
This piecemeal approach is how a Jewish activist like Michael
Horowitz addressed the many conservative Protestants who
eventually supported the IRFA, arguing as if to say 'how can you
not use your political clout to prevent the suffering that
repressive governments around the world inflict as a matter of
policy on the very people-made in God's image and so worth no
less than any of you-that your returning missionaries speak
about on Sunday mornings?'. 13
Moreover, and more importantly, this case-by-case approach
indicates a broader point about persuasion: even in a pluralistic
society, political persuasion need not proceed by appealing to
commonly, much less universally, shared or sharable claims. If
Hertzke's story has any moral, it is that democracy requires
neither an aspiration to universality, nor an avoidance of
intractable disagreements by retreating to common ground, 14 but
a willingness to enter into the mindset of those with whom one
has profound disagreements in order to discern particular
commitments that might lead them nevertheless to support one's
favorite policies.
Not only does a well-functioning democracy not require that
citizens and legislators advert to the universal, widely shared, or
13 See generally id. at 150.
14 CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 53 (Cambridge University

Press 1987)
The neutral justification of political neutrality is based upon what I believe is a
universal norm of rational dialogue. When two people disagree about some specific
point, but wish to continue talking about the more general problem they wish to
solve, each should prescind from the beliefs that the other rejects, (1) in order to
construct an argument on the basis of his other beliefs that will convince the other
of the truth of the disputed belief, or (2) in order to shift to another aspect of the
problem, where the possibilities of agreement seem greater. In the face of
disagreement, those who wish to continue the conversation should retreat to
neutral ground, with the hope either of resolving the dispute or bypassing it. Id.
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commonly acceptable, neither is it the case that just democratic
outcomes require anything like a translation from the religious to
the universal.' 5 In order to see why, imagine an idealized world a distant possible world, no doubt - in which everyone supports
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, but in which each is led to
do so by various distinct and incompatible reasons. In this
situation, it seems that no-one has any legitimate complaint
about the enactment of that law. So long as Bill Bennett, Gloria
Steinem, Paul Wellstone, Sam Brownback, Barbara Mikulski,
and Chuck Colson have what each severally regards as adequate
reason to support the act, why should any of them care if no-one
is convinced by an argument persuasive to all, most, or even
many? So long as Bennett has what he regards as a compelling
reason to support some legislation, and Steinem has another
reason, different from, and even incompatible with Bennett's,
and so on for everyone else, so that all agree that the policy is
correct, but disagree about why, then no-one has adequate reason
to object. Precisely because there can be convergence on a law
without consensus with respect to the reasons for that law,16 it is
doubtful that we have anything more than merely pragmatic
reason to want citizens or legislators to support favored policies
by appeal to universal values. I doubt that we have even that
pragmatic reason.
Not only do just outcomes not require anything like recourse to
the universal, shared or common, I see no good reason to follow
Obama in pitting the "religion-specific" against the "universal" or
"common." Of course, whether there is good reason to do so
depends on what we mean by the 'religious' and the 'universal' or
'common' - and those are murky concepts indeed. There are
many different ways to construe the claim that religious reasons
are, as a class, sectarian, particularistic, inaccessible, or
otherwise narrow in a way that renders them politically
troubling. And differing construals will have differing degrees of
plausibility.
Consider in this regard one construal that I suspect captures
Senator Obama's line of thought. We might adopt a sociological
15 Such as, for example, to support only those policies for which there is a sound
argument that contains only widely affirmed of commonly shared premises.
16 I owe this formulation to Jerry Gaus, for whose help on this topic I am much
indebted.
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gloss on Obama's disjunction between the religion-specific and
the universal: religious claims are less popular (affirmed by fewer
people) than other sorts of reasons-secular reasons, or some
subset of secular reasons. But I doubt that that construal of
Obama's distinction obtains the result he intends. I gather that
religious reasons are pretty unpopular in, say, Sweden,
Denmark, and the Harvard faculty lounge. But that is hardly
the case in the United States generally. The first moral language
of a good many Americans is religious and biblical, not secular.
Consider in this regard a claim at the heart of the American, and
indeed any liberal polity, viz. that each and every human being
has great and equal worth. Surely a biblical justification for that
politically ramifying claim is far more likely to garner support
than available secular justifications; the biblical reasoning being
that because each and every human being has been created in
God's image, each human being has great worth, and because
being created in God's image does not come in degrees, it follows
that each and every human being has great and equal worth.17
Some religious claims, to include some political ramifying
religious claims, are extremely popular. Very many secular
claims-Kantian claims about the moral importance of rational
autonomy, for example-are highly sectarian. Given that the
religious is, as a sociological matter, the universal (or at least the
common), it is doubtful that we must translate from the religious
to the universal.
Of course, this hardly settles the matter. Perhaps some other
variation on this position will fare better. Let me just register
skepticism and move on. I see no good reason to disjoin the
accessible, natural, common, shared, universal, or otherwise
'broad' from the inaccessible, unnatural, uncommon, sectarian,
particular or otherwise 'narrow,' and then to relegate all religious
reasons to the narrow backwater.IS
THE IDEAL OF CONSCIENTIOUS ENGAGEMENT

If we need not accept Senator Obama's claim that we translate
17 As happens to be the case, it is this kind of claim that played an important role in
persuading religious citizens, activists and legislators to support the IRFA, Trafficking
Victim Protection Act, and Sudan Peace Act. See HERTZKE, supra note 6, at 162, 326.
18 See
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J.

EBERLE,

RELIGIOUS

CONVICTION IN

LIBERAL

(Cambridge University Press 2002) (attempting to defend this skepticism).

POLITICS,
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from the religious to the universal, common or shared, how
should religious believers conduct themselves in political
decision-making and advocacy?
I will briefly sketch an
alternative.
For a number of fairly obvious reasons, it would be a morally
terrific thing if each and every citizen had what each regards as
adequate reason to support every piece of legislation to which
they are subject. We therefore have some reason to try to
approximate that ideal state. In order to do so, we would do well
to abide by an account of the terms of political engagement
between committed liberal democrats that I prefer to call an ideal
of conscientious engagement.
This ideal has roughly two parts. First, we should do the best
we can to determine which of the feasible political options before
us is morally best, and then we should support the very policy we
believe to be morally best. When we do so, we should employ the
epistemic resources available to us, and we may do so by relying
on any of the truths we responsibly take to bear on the matter at
hand. So if I am a secularist who believes that some version of
utilitarianism is the sober moral truth, then I have all the reason
I need to employ my utilitarian convictions to determine which of
the policy options before me maximizes the relevant good. In
that case, my support for some legislation might properly depend
on a rationale I know that many of my compatriots properly
reject. A comparable point applies forthwith to other believers,
whether Christian, Wiccan, Hindu, Kantian, and so on. It should
go without saying that I cannot do the best I can to determine
which policy option is best without listening to my compatriots,
learning from them and, in particular, opening up my political
convictions to their critical scrutiny.
Second, we should do the best we can to persuade our
compatriots to support the policies we take to be morally best. In
my view, respect for our compatriots as having great and equal
worth requires us to do what we can to approximate the ideal
state of affairs in which all have what each regards as adequate
reason for the laws we must obey.19 With respect to some of our
compatriots, this will involve articulating the arguments that
actually persuade me. Hopefully some others will be persuaded
19 For arguments, see id. at 84-151.
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by the arguments that I actually find persuasive. But for those
who have fundamentally different normative commitments, the
arguments that convince me will ring hollow. And in that case, I
have to exit from my parochial point of view, see how things look
from my compatriots' perspective, and then do my level best to
articulate reasons that persuade them. To the secular utilitarian,
I can try to show that my favored policy maximizes net value; to
Conservative Protestant I can appeal to the Bible; to the Muslim
the Koran; to the Catholic, church authority or natural law. That
being said, I need not exit my parochial point of view by aspiring
20
to some common, shared or universal perspective.
I should form my political commitments as best I can, given my
epistemic resources, listen to others, and revise my commitments
in light of what they say. I should try to persuade others by
appealing to their commitments, and hopefully get them to see
matters my way, though not necessarily in my way. Moreover, I
should expect my compatriots to return the favor: they should
form their political commitments as best they can, given their
epistemic resources, they should listen to me, and revise their
commitments in light of what I say. They should try to persuade
me by appealing to my commitments, and hopefully get me to see
things their way, though not necessarily in their way. In so
doing each of us strives to maximize the number of people who
support the policies they believe, in good conscience, to be
morally correct.
But of course, in the real world, we not only never reach
consensus as to why the laws that govern us are appropriate, we
seldom reach convergence on the laws to which we must submit.
No matter how
We disagree about both what and why.
assiduously we strive to articulate arguments that persuade
others that our favored policies are correct, there will always be
some epistemically competent and morally sensitive peers who
are utterly unpersuaded-and rightly so given their noetic
endowment. That is the cost of living in a pluralistic liberal
20 Of course, as a practical matter, I might try to articulate some widely shared
reasons. But I need not do so, and if I have enough time on my hands, I can address to
each person some rationale that articulates with their deepest, most heartfelt, and
perhaps their most parochial, commitments. Moreover, I can be explicit about the fact
that I am articulating various arguments that I do not, but that I hope members of my
audience do, find sound. So long as I am forthcoming in that respect, I insure that I am
not manipulating my compatriots.
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polity. Disagreement is endemic and ineradicable. Moreover, at
some point the conversation has to stop, and we have to make a
collective decision about what to do.
Forced choices are
unavoidable. Faced with such forced and contentious choices,
each of us should act as conscience dictates, with the result that
some of us win and some lose. The cost of living in a pluralistic
society is that some of us will inevitably be subject to laws we
take ourselves to have adequate reason to reject. This is how it
has been, is now, and ever will be.
There is, of course, an alternative to this view. According to
some versions of 'public reason liberalism,' respect for persons
forbids us to support laws that our morally sensitive and
epistemically competent compatriots have good reason to reject. 2 1
But, to substitute dogmatic assertion for lengthy argument, this
position in untenable, for it forbids us to enact legislation that we
have powerful moral reason to enact. In a pluralistic society,
some morally sensitive and epistemically competent peers will
reject laws that are in fact morally crucial, in which case the
balance of moral considerations decides in favor of imposition.
We cannot allow the mistakes of even our moral and epistemic
peers to prevent us from supporting morally necessary policies.
EQUAL TREATMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE SECULAR

Now, the ideal of conscientious engagement mentions nothing
in particular about the proper role of religious reasons in political
decision-making and advocacy. But its implications for that topic
are not difficult to draw out. I will mention two and then draw a
general conclusion.
First, the ideal of conscientious engagement requires us to do
our level best to articulate some rationale that our compatriots
find persuasive, and because a pluralistic society will inevitably
include some secularists, it follows that those who support some
policy on religious grounds must do what they can to articulate
some secular rationale for that policy. Religious citizens must
attempt to articulate secular reasons for their favored policies.
Note, though, that what is good for the religious goose is equally
fine for the secular gander. If secularists support some policy to
21 Although typically associated with John Rawls, I find Jerry Gaus' formulation of
the position the most compelling.
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which their compatriots have religious objections, then
secularists have an obligation to exit their parochial perspective,
inhabit the mindset of their religious compatriots, and do what
they can to persuade their religious compatriots to support their
favored policy. Of course, I am assuming here that a secularist
who provides a religious believer with a secular rationale, does
not thereby provide any reason that does, or should, persuade the
believer. This assumption seems correct.
Second, although the ideal of conscientious engagement
requires us to strive to persuade our compatriots, it recognizes
that our aspirations will sometimes meet with failure, and it
permits us to support laws for which some of our compatriots
lack what they regard as an adequate rationale. This general
claim applies to religiously grounded laws. It is possible, in
principle, that we support some law for which we have an
exclusively religious rationale even though we fully comply with
the ideal of conscientious engagement, and hence it is possible
that we permissibly pass some law that has only a religious
rationale. This possibility is not, so far as I can tell, a political
feasibility in the contemporary United States, where any law
that is passed must, as a practical matter, have the support of no
doubt a variety of secular reasons. Nevertheless, it is a logical
possibility, and should it be realized, nothing morally wrong need
have been done. A law that lacks adequate secular support need
not be morally defective in any respect. Of course, a comparable
point applies to laws that are unpersuasive to religious believers.
It is logically possible, though politically infeasible, that we pass
some law that lacks any rationale that is persuasive to religious
believers, and such a law would not necessarily be morally
defective in any respect. 22
These two implications of the ideal of conscientious
engagement for the proper political role of religious reasons,
exemplify an important principle: not only does the ideal of
conscientious engagement treat religious and secular reasons
equally, any normative constraint that applies to the reasons on
the basis of which we make political decisions, or advocate for our
favored policies, must apply impartially to religious and secular
22 It is at this point that a liberalism of conscience, guided by the ideal of
conscientious engagement, diverges most crucially from what I take to be the most
plausible version of public reason liberalism.
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reasons. Equal treatment of religious and secular reasons is the
order of the day. Religious believers have no more, and no less, a
responsibility to aspire to persuade their secular compatriots
than secularists have an obligation to aspire to persuade their
religious compatriots. If laws that lack a plausible religious
rationale are permissible, then so are laws that lack a plausible
secular rationale. If secularists may support laws solely on the
basis of reasons that fail to persuade religious believers, then so
also may religious believers support laws solely on the basis of
reasons that fail to persuade secularists.
Now, for some, the ideal of conscientious engagement is
objectionable precisely because it requires us to treat religious
and secular reasons equally. Somehow or other, 'the religious' is
relevantly different than 'the secular' and so deserves differential
treatment. On the basis of some such claim, it is plausible to
suppose that religious believers must translate their religious
arguments into some other language - secular, accessible, or
universal - but that secularists need not translate their secular
arguments into religious language. I take Senator Obama to
endorse this sort of asymmetry.
I cannot address all of the moves available to advocates of this
religion-discriminating view. Certain moves I will not discuss,
other than to dismiss them outright. So for example, it is not the
case that religious believers are more likely to support morally
unjust or otherwise defective policies than secularists. Nor are
religious believers likely to be more dogmatic and intolerant than
their secular counterparts. Nor, as I have already indicated, are
religious claims less popular as a sociological matter than secular
claims. Other possibilities merit more serious, though
abbreviated, treatment.
Some claim that religious and secular reasons deserve
differential treatment because religious reasons lack some
important epistemic property possessed by secular reasons. This
is, of course, a claim with many more than a few formulationsone for each epistemic property. Consider, for example, the claim
that religious reasons lack, but that secular reasons possess, the
crucially important epistemic desideratum of being open to
critical evaluation.
The claim is that secular reasons are
grounded in 'evidence' and amenable to rational critique, but that
religious reasons
are grounded on non-rational faith
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commitments, are immune to contrary evidence, and thereby
function as 'conversation-stoppers' when employed as a basis for
supporting public policy. 2 3 But this strikes me as risible. From
my experience, religious believers disagree, debate, and declaim
incessantly. Whatever else they do, faith commitments do not
end conversations. Of course, in order to have a productive and
illuminating conversation with a religious believer, one has to
know about the particularities of the interlocutor's faith
tradition. And some might not be interested in doing what it
takes to enter into a productive conversation with religious
believers-perhaps
debates
between
utilitarianism
and
Kantianism seem attractive in a way that Koranic interpretation
does not. But we should not confuse the claim that a Christian,
Jew, or Muslim's religious convictions are immune to criticism
with the very different claim that others are not sufficiently
interested in Christianity, Judaism, or Islam to put themselves
in a position to articulate convincing criticisms.
We cannot address each plausible formulation of the claim that
there is some crucial epistemic desideratum that separate the
secular wheat from the religious chaff. Nevertheless, there is a
general reason to reject this view, however formulated. Secular
reasons are an epistemically mixed bag. The secular reasons
that advocates of the religion-discriminating view must regard as
justifying legislation exhibit a diverse array of epistemic
desiderata.
Some justifying secular reasons-introspective
claims about the contents of one's state of mind, sense-perceptual
claims about middle-sized physical objects, or scientific claims
about the human genome-exhibit a large number of important
epistemic desiderata, and so fall on the upper end of the
epistemic spectrum. Other justifying secular reasons-moral
claims about the proportionality of waging war against an
aggressor--exhibit comparatively fewer important epistemic
desiderata, and thus fall rather lower on the epistemic spectrum.
Now it would be objectionably arbitrary to deny a justifying role
to religious reasons that have the very epistemic status possessed
by epistemically inferior but justifying secular reasons. And it
seems that some religious reasons have an epistemic status no
23 The locus classicus for this view is RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE,
RELIGION AS A CONVERSATION-STOPPER 168-174 (Penguin Books 200).
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lower than that enjoyed by some justifying secular reasons that
fall on the low end of the epistemic spectrum. Compare, for
example, the epistemic status of the politically important claim
(1) that a given war satisfies the proportionality criteria
advocated by Just War theorists with the claim (2) that each
human being has great worth by virtue of being created in God's
image. Does (1) possess epistemic desiderata that (2) lacks, that
are significant enough to grant to (1) a political role that we deny
to (2)? I doubt it, and that is why it seems objectionably
arbitrary to deny that, as a general matter, religious reasons can
justify legislation. Not, that is, on the basis of the claim that
they lack some crucial epistemic desideratum.
Of course, there is much more to say. This short discussion
serves only as a placeholder for a much longer and far more
complicated argument in support of the claim that there are no
differences between religious reasons and secular reasons that
serve as a principled basis for denying that religious reasons may
play the political role permitted to secular reasons.
I am
confident that it is possible to articulate a convincing case for
that claim. If so, then the ideal of conscientious engagement is
not vulnerable by virtue of its assumption that the secular and
religious deserve equal treatment. Of course, that we should
accord religious and secular reasons equal treatment implies that
religious reasons do not get a free pass. We should treat religious
reasons for a policy with which we disagree just as we should any
other kind of reason for a policy with which we disagree. Our
compatriots may rely on the reasons they conscientiously and
responsibly believe to be compelling, but we are free to expose
flaws in logic or substance. All reasons are to be included, but all
are dissected, scrutinized, criticized. The watchword is, in short,
let a thousand flowers bloom, religious and secular, but be
prepared to take out the pruning sheers.

